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Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Hybrid Terrorist Attack on a Power Plant 
Abstract: 
In our thesis we want to compare costs between two different approaches that have the 
same goal – compromise a power plant by creating a physical effect (whether destruction 
of the whole facility or some of its parts and by that disrupting the power supply operation 
for a long term, optionally causing human casualties). We saw that in most research papers 
and media publications main focus is on just hacking into the power plant stating that it is 
way too expensive to become a usual practice for terrorists, unless state funded. We point 
out that physical aspect is often omitted – both when designing security systems of a facil-
ity and also when thinking about attack vectors and foreseeing threats to our way of living. 
Our main message is to think cyber and physical together – map logical topology to physi-
cal and see if some critical parts are easier to access physically than via logical cyber hubs. 
For modelling attack scenarios we use attack tree diagrams and for analysing resources 
needed to achieve stated goal we use cost-benefit analysis (with the only difference – ben-
efit is the same for both cyber and hybrid scenarios). Our main hypothesis states that hy-
brid approach, combination of cyber and physical means to compromise the power plant, 
is cheaper than pure cyber. 
This thesis is written in English and is 46 pages long, including 9 chapters, 12 figures and 
1 table. 
Keywords:  
SCADA, Cyber Terrorism, Attack Tree, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Hybrid Attack, Power 
Plant, Critical Infrastructure 
CERCS: P170 (Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control) 
Elektrijaamadele suunatud hübriid terrorirünnaku kulude-tulude 
analüüs 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Uurimustöö sihiks on võrrelda kahe erineva, ühtse eesmärgiga lähenemisviisi maksumust. 
Mõlema lähenemisviisi eesmärgiks on elektrijaama ohtu seadmine tegeliku kahju tekita-
mise teel (s.h terve rajatise hävitamine või rajatise osade hävitamine, takistamaks pikaajal-
ist energia tootmist, valikuliselt inimohvritega). Tuvastasime, et enamuses uurimustöödes 
ja meediaväljaannetes on peamine rõhuasetus üksnes elektrijaama häkkimisel, järeldades, 
et selline meetod ei saa kulukuse tõttu muutuda terroristide tavapäraseks tegutsemisviisiks 
(v.a juhtudel, kus antud tegevus on riigi poolt rahastatud). Osutame välja, et rünnaku füüsi-
line külg on sageli välja jäetud - seda nii rajatiste turvasüsteemide disainis kui ka ründe-
vektorite analüüsis ja meie eluviisi ohustavate aspektide ennustamises. Meie peamiseks 
sõnumiks on analüüsida küber- ja füüsilisi osi kombineeritult - kaardistades 
võrgutopoloogia füüsilisele ja analüüsides, kas kriitilistele osadele on lihtsam ligi pääseda 
füüsiliselt või võrguühenduse kaudu. Rünnakustsenaariumide modelleerimiseks kasutame 
ründepuudiagramme ja vaja minevate vahendite uurimiseks rakendame tasuvuse ja kasu 
analüüsi (ainsaks erinevuseks on, et kasu on sama küber- ja hübriidstsenaariumide puhul). 
Meie peamiseks hüpoteesiks on, et hübriidne lähenemisviis - kombineerides küber- ja 
füüsilised vahendid elektrijaama ohtu seadmiseks - on odavam kui puhtalt küberrünnak. 
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Lõputöö on kirjutatud Inglise keeles ning sisaldab teksti 46 leheküljel, 9 peatükki, 12 
joonist, 1 tabel. 
Võtmesõnad: 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Aim of the Research 
“What we’re trying to do is introduce a culture where you expect the attacks and build in 
resilience so that when they come it doesn’t really have much effect”. 
Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director at Chatham House 
The main goal of this study is to make a reasonable evaluation of how expensive and real 
it is for a non-state funded terrorist organisation to apply a combination of physical and 
cyber approach when trying to compromise a power plant. It is important to understand 
the first and foremost goal for terrorists is to cause fear. Which could be achieved by the 
striking result of the attack (such as physical destruction, people’s death at best) and good 
media coverage. There are definitely no worries about the media – even not so harmful 
attacks on an object of critical infrastructure were present – so our guess is that if attack is 
heavy enough to cause death and/or physical destructions, it for sure will appear in the late 
evening breaking news section. Therefore we focus our attention on physical destruction 
aspect. We do not emphasise that much on possible deadly outcomes as it is something 
hard to predict and to work with; our final achievement is causing physical effect in one of 
the critical parts of a theoretical power plant. 
1.2. Research relevance and novelty 
As a cybersecurity expert Robert M. Lee, CEO of industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos, 
Inc., noted in his interview with “Scientific American”, attacks against critical in-
frastructure become more and more aggressive [29]. After STUXNET the speed and he 
scope are only increasing. Attacks on Ukrainian power grids in Decembers 2015–2016, 
that left the whole region without power for hours [28]. “BlackEnergy” and “BlackEner-
gy2” (also found in the attack on US power grids in 2016 in Vermont [34]), malware tar-
geting specific high level systems [30].  “Havex”, crafted for industrial objects and so on 
[31]. 
It is arguable that the information-technology part is still relatively expensive [2], but we 
see that the toolbox is growing and there is less and less to tailor yourself. In addition to it 
we have time proof physical means of intrusion and destruction – relatively cheap, easy to 
comprehend. That is boosted with even higher demand on this type of attack and its influ-
ence. As a result we get a dangerous brewing that threatens to explode any day.  
Maybe even right now there is someone planning an attack on industrial object, as we 
speak. So we might as well start getting prepared. 
Also we rarely see people thinking about cyber and physical together. If they look at the 
network topology, it gives them information on how many hubs should be passed to get to 
the target. But what if by looking at the physical locations of those server it is easier to get 
through one hub which would allow the attacker to compromise the next one by physical 
means by just being there? That is why when we protect our network we should also keep 
the physical protection relevant to the object’s importance.  
Our contribution is looking in a new way at the critical infrastructure and power plants as 
such. We apply a mapping between physical zones and logical hubs of the network topol-
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ogy to see what are the protective measures and point out if there are relevant or not de-
pending on importance of those hubs and servers. We also band methodologies to suit our 
purpose – we want to compare costs involved in achieving the very same goal but in dif-
ferent ways – pure cyber scenario and the hybrid one (where we combine cyber and physi-
cal means to move forward). For that we use attack trees for building our scenarios and 
cost-benefit analysis to present evaluation of our nodes (keeping in mind that benefits are 
equal and we are comparing costs only). 
1.3. Research Questions 
This thesis makes its best to answer the following questions and concerns: 
1. How much would a hybrid terrorist attack costs? 
2. Is it even a plausible scenario that terrorist would choose when there are so many 
other options to cause death and fear? 
1.4. Research Scope 
To narrow down our field of research, we are mainly interested in intrusion techniques that 
the attackers might use. Other means, such as ransomware, encryption etc are not that im-
portant to us as they do not lead to a physical damage. We are looking into different access 
points and ways to infiltrate the system that would allow the attacker to get inside the 
power plant and cause an actual physical damage – whether to people inside or critical 
systems in the secured zones. Which means that we do not look exactly at the STUXNET 
scenario [6], where physical damage was caused, as it was done only by cyber means and 
nobody has died. STUXNET was a precedent, but it has lost its novelty over the time. We 
are looking into more actual type of a threat that can still surprise public. 
We are also keeping our focus on the Stage II type of attacks – those that result in tempo-
rary loss of power, physical damage to equipment or other actually visible impact [29]. 
Though Stage I attack, performed mainly to obtain information, can be a stepping point for 
our end goal with the notation that it will be targeting information from a specific system 
to learn more about it so that a tailored exploit can be made and later activities would be 
more accurate for the object [33]. 
1.5. Agents 
There are quite many actors that could consider such attack. Let us have a closer look at 
these groups and define our persons of interest. The most common types can include 
script-kiddiez/hobbyist, cyber criminals on someone’s payroll, state sponsored groups etc. 
For the purpose of our research we focus on non-state funded terrorist organisations. 
Script-kiddiez and hobbyists 
By definition script-kiddiez do not have applicable knowledge nor resources to perform 
this kind of attack. Frankly, they also lack motivation to do so – too hard to achieve, too 
high responsibility level [12]. If we imagine a typical hobbyist, it is a person who explores 
the area, might have some intentions and able to find tools, written by others, to hit from 
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low to middle range of troubles [13]. Therefore getting hands dirty on a power plant is out 
of their competence. For now. 
Hacktivists 
The main difference between script-kiddiez and hacktivists is their motivation. The later 
usually have a political view to defend or to show their position regarding social matters. 
Hacktivists vary in their competence and they even make claims to be able to shut down 
the whole Internet [14], but so far no real damage was made. Also attacking a power plant 
might not be the most preferable vector of attack for them as it is a neutral object that usu-
ally does not represent any political party, group or a process. Therefore it is not a very 
plausible scenario to consider at the moment. 
Cyber criminals 
This type of attackers usually consider profit as their main motivation therefore taking 
down such a massive facility would only be by orders of a superior power. In which case it 
makes more sense to consider that power as the main actor, not criminals themselves as 
they would not be constrained with the financial part of the deal, they will be paid just 
enough to implement it. 
Non-state funded terrorist organisations 
We do not consider state actors by default as we assume that they have unlimited set of 
resources which makes any type of attack accessible from a financial point of view. There-
fore our main attacker is a non-state funded terrorist organisation – which means any 
group of individuals that uses terror as a tool to achieve their goals, mainly political ones 
[15]. The list is quite long, the most known entities are ISIS (Daesh), Al Qaeda, Hezbollah 
etc. Some of them have already claimed or even planned an attack on a power plants but 
so far no success has been seen [16]. This general category of attackers shows the most 
motivation to attempt an attack on a power plant and also has much wider resources com-
pared to other groups [28], which is why we chose it to be the main actor in our attack 
model. 
1.6. Agent’s Motivation 
The main reason behind such attack is its scope. A power plant is a facility that provides 
resources to the whole communities and other services such as hospitals and somehow 
critical establishments. The scope is important as it maximises the amount of people af-
fected and therefore their fear. One of other options would be to use some sort of a weapon 
of mass destruction, but those are difficult to get in a quiet manner, hard to sustain and 
also require much higher and more specific expertise [17]. Also power plants as a vital 
part of energy supply system have become symbols of Western World technology – some-
thing that most terrorist organisation claim to fight on a fundamental level. They portray 
West as a mechanism without a soul, without the right religion and without any right to 
claim itself as a developed civilisation. Therefore attacking a power plant caries very im-
portant symbolic message in itself. 
Another reason for that is that long absence of a power resource can cause public unrest 
and even riots, that can be enough to destabilise a country and its government [24] [26]. 
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This can be used in misbalancing political power distribution in a region with further fol-
low up steps. 
1.7. Research Limitations 
“The sky's the limit. Your sky. Your limit”. 
Tom Hiddleston 
One of the main limitations in constructing the attack tree is our imagination. It is nearly 
impossible to say if a certain attack tree is complete as there are always more options to 
achieve the same goal. There is basically endless set of possibilities to how the end goal 
can be reached – from an absolutely new path to a set of small differences in each node. 
Not to mention how subjective this approach is; two different people would come up with 
two very different attack trees even if given the same facility to attack and the same means 
to do so. Therefore the result of our research covers only some of the scenarios that could 
unravel in such setup. But to provide better image of possible attack vectors we looked at 
what has happened before, what was claimed, what was threatened and what ideas were 
applied to other objects. 
Another constraint is how much our attack tree depends on initial parameters and what we 
know about the attacker, which is also limited by natural causes of not having enough in-
formation about certain terrorist groups capabilities. We can model, we can read through 
news articles and other research works, but we can only try to make it as close to reality as 
possible, it will never reflect the real situation fully. 
We also provide prices for certain skills, materials, acts and devices as for today and this 
can change with time and so diminishing the relevance of our results. But to the fairness, 
we are trying to understand if such attack is plausible to be performed today, therefore our 
time borders are aligned with our results. 
Last but not least, it’s nearly impossible to model a universal attack tree that could be ap-
plied to any power plant without losing precision. Every facility has its own topology, in-
ternal rules and regulations. What is possible to perform in one place, would not get adver-
saries as far in another location. So our goal is to strike a balance – to cover scope wide 
enough to be representative of the results, yet save level of precision that would still be 
enough to show the point and to be relevant. 
1.8. Thesis Structure 
After stating definition and having a look at the literature review in chapters 1-4, we de-
scribe in Chapter 5 our methodology and how did we change canonic methods to suit our 
research purpose and reflect end results better. 
After that we would have a couple of words in Chapter 6 about the background scenario 
that describes a prototype systems that our theoretical attack would want to compromise. 
We will describe its network topology, physical plan and how is it connected to each other. 
In Chapter 7 we already present our designed attack scenarios in a shape of attack trees 
and clarify how does it all go along and what inspired each path and node. It directly leads 
to result calculations in Chapter 8 and is summarised by a conclusion in Chapter 9. 
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2. Terms and Notations 
In order to ensure that everybody understands the thesis the same way, we clarify the main 
terms and notations used in our research. 
Power plant (Estonian elektrijaam) is a complex of structures, machinery, and associated 
equipment for generating electricity from another source of energy, such as nuclear reac-
tions or a hydroelectric dam. Also called generating station, power station [1]. Power 
plants are part of the critical infrastructure as they produce vital energy to a big scale of 
customers. It provides electricity to the end users such as other infrastructure objects, 
cities, villages, business structures, households and others.  
Hybrid terrorist attack (Estonian hybrid terrorirünnak) is an attack performed by estab-
lished terrorist organisation which uses both physical (explosion, intrusion, destruction 
etc) and cyber (remote access, video surveillance control, machine infecting) means. As a 
cyber part we include but do not limit to: 
• direct misuse of cyberspace facilities that are connected to the target; 
• intrusion in a computer network or system; 
• espionage in a sense of collecting information from a target’s systems and 
databases.. 
SCADA systems (Estonian SCADA süsteemid) stands for “Supervisory Controls and Data 
Acquisition” and is a set communications protocols designed for the exchange of control 
messages on industrial networks” [20]. So we are talking about the system that takes care 
of our power plant maintenance and internal communications, along with ensuring that 
facility is secured. There are many specific protocols for different types of the critical in-
frastructure objects – MODBUS, DNP3, EtherNET/IP, PROFIBUS, Foundation Fieldbus 
etc – each tailored to serve specific purposes and types of communication. 
So far efficiency of passing on communication was more prioritised than security. At most, 
security concerns were covered by isolating the whole system from the outside world and 
networks. But as automation and global integrity rise, it is no longer a case – you can see 
plenty of power plants and other objects of critical infrastructure connected to the Internet 
[27]. As [power] grid cybersecurity expert Robert M. Lee, CEO of industrial cybersecurity 
firm Dragos, Inc. pointed out, “...because of business reasons, because of lack of people to 
man the jobs, we’re starting to see more and more computer-based systems. We’re starting 
to see more common operating platforms. And this facilitates a scale for adversaries that 
they couldn’t previously get” [29]. 
If you even just search for “SCADA” at https://www.shodan.io/, it will show you at least 
600 connected systems [22]. We can see what SCADA protocols they use, what SSL ver-
sion and even the operating systems they use as the hosts! There we can also check the 
“Exploits” tab to see how many different exploits were already created and reported, 
straight to their source code [23]. Therefore, we can see that this set of protocols is highly 
exploitable and targeted. 
$  10
This is mainly due to the fact that “...most SCADA protocols were designed long before 
network security perceived to be a problem. The traditional SCADA system was a closed 
serial network that contained only trusted devices with little or no connection to the out-
side world” [20], which means that we put part of our critical infrastructure security on 
legacy. 
$  11
3. Problem Statement 
"A problem well-stated is a problem half-solved”.  
Charles Kettering, inventor 
Even though the studies in the literature do take a terrorist threat as a major point in gener-
al assessment, it still concentrates mostly on pure types – totally physical or full cyber at-
tack. To the present time they analyse a terrorist organisation capabilities from the point of 
view of how many bombs can they produce and how close can they come near the target. 
Usually they dismiss the possibility of a pure cyber terrorist attack (not a state funded) in a 
nearest future by reasoning it with a high price and complexity of such action. “The [ter-
rorist attack] planners would conclude that costs are high, outcomes are too uncertain for 
an untested practice such as this and, ultimately, few Internet attacks would directly kill 
people. They would suggest that, for the time being, the organisation should concentrate 
on more traditional core-business (for instance, car-bombs), while waiting for three condi-
tions to occur” [2] (low price, certain results and direct casualties). 
In her study Maura Conway also advocates the small likelihood of pure cyber attack by 
referring to the main goal of a terrorist action – spread fear. “Because ‘real world’ [physi-
cal] attacks are cheaper and less complex while also being significantly destructive of 
lives and property and, importantly, emotionally impactful so therefore also attention-get-
ting to an extent that cyberterrorism will struggle to achieve” [3]. If people don’t see a fire, 
it’s hard to make them feel scared and start panicking. 
Our goal and contribution is to test this believe allowing an alternative scenario to unravel 
– a hybrid attack, which combines cyber and physical parts, hence lowers the cost of the 
whole agenda and thus making it more attractive for the terrorists to implement. We will 
look at the situation that answers the question “What if terrorists use cyber as a supportive 
tool, and mix it with the usual physical actions?”. This hybrid approach gives terrorists so 
much more possibilities and attack vectors – if with just a suicide bomb they can damage 
the surface, then with disabling video surveillance they can come much closer and create 
even bigger damage. 
As a result, we want to test the following main hypothesis (smaller clarification could be 
formulated during the research): 
H0: Hybrid attack is significantly cheaper compared to a pure cyber attack for achieving 
the result that is equal in damage. 
As a target was chosen a power plant, but this principle applies to any Critical In-
frastructure Object (CIO). Choosing a concrete kind of CIO allows us to build a prototype 
system for a better demonstration and analysis. 
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4. Literature Review 
Bangs for the Buck - A Cost Benefit Analysis of Cyberterrorism by Giampiero Gia-
comello 
This article is mostly role-plays from a perspective of a hypothetical terrorist group (not a 
state sponsored), which might get interested in applying cyberterrorism in their toolkit. To 
summarise it, we can just quote the study itself: “This article argues that, under these con-
ditions, cyberterrorism would be a highly inefficient solution for terrorists, due to high 
costs and meager returns. The article explores these questions and hypotheses by applying 
the economic efficiency logic of cost-benefit analysis” [2]. By “these conditions” author 
means that the initial goal – break things kill people – is much easier achieved by follow-
ing traditional means as making bombs, taking hostages etc – it is cheaper, more spectacu-
lar and calls for an attention of the general public, not only technical specialists who could 
be concerned about a cyber attack. 
From a positive side, “Bangs for the Buck…” gives a very wide analysis on a matter of 
cyberterrorism and what is its practical usage. We can derive both quantitative as well as 
qualitative analysis on a given data. It also states strict and clear conclusion that cyberter-
rorism is not something we should be afraid of in the nearest future (5-15 years). 
The downside of this study, but could also be intentional, is that Prof Giacomello looks at 
a very pure type such as cyberterrorism. He analyses only those attacks and threats caused 
purely by cyber means. And what we see from a current state and news – that is not what 
is evolving right now. There is no jump between technologies – they are applied in a more 
gradient way, step by step. So if we take author’s words “that is not going to happen in the 
next years” we might find ourselves in situation when it is way too late be concerned by 
something which is a reality already. 
Hybrid: what’s in a name? by Jan Joel Andersson and Thierry Tardy 
The article in its essence tries to narrow down terminology of a hybrid warfare – which 
includes both physical and cyber means, along with conventional and non-conventional 
ways of attacking. Authors present their view on hybrid threats in these words: “Simply 
put, for a threat to be of a ‘hybrid’ nature it needs to be the product of multiple ways to 
threaten or attack its intended target – much as a hybrid species is produced by combining 
different breeds or varieties. It is therefore the mix of different methods – conventional 
and unconventional, military and non-military – which makes a threat hybrid” [5]. 
The article argues though that just by using cyber means the attack cannot be presumed 
hybrid by default – it also depends on its aims and more of intermediate aims of using 
technologies, as said: “Terrorism, cybercrime, trafficking and extortion are not per se hy-
brid in nature; they may become so depending on how (and to what extent) they are pur-
sued using multiple tactics simultaneously” [5]. 
It is a relief to see somebody to actually attempt to see combination of cyber and physical 
means and even put it in the common structure. Though in this article, even though it tries 
to clarify things, it might just confuse them even more. Authors do not state clearly to 
what category should combined approach belong, as well as they put way too many differ-
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ent things under one hood – such as naming both combinations of military/non-military 
and physical/cyber as a hybrid type of an attack. 
One of the crucial points here is that with certain type of attack the corresponding re-
sponse is required. On example of a non-military attack authors explain that a non-military 
approach should be applied. Which also projects itself of our focus – if we expect terror-
ists to use both physical and cyber means at the same time, we need to build our defence 
systems accordingly. 
Cyberterrorism After Stuxnet by Thomas M. Chen 
This work analyses our view on the world after Stuxnet events started in 2010. It mostly 
focuses on one and only precedent of cyber attack which is known to cause a real touch-
able impact. Before Stuxnet “…terrorists are known to be using the Internet for various 
routine purposes. The discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 was a milestone in the arena of cyber-
security because, although a malware attack on industrial control systems was long be-
lieved to be theoretically possible, it was different to see malware used in reality to cause 
real physical damage” [6]. 
Even though here we see an actual cyber attack present, the general view remains sceptical 
about future possibilities. Stuxnet was exceptional and it stays this way – an exception. 
Thomas Chen says that from a cost-benefit point of view balance did not change, and 
Stuxnet malware is not reusable as it was very well tailored for that exact set of in-
frastructure so redoing it for a more unified usage would be the same as writing a new 
malware from a scratch. 
We can see that again focusing on a pure types of attack do not give us much of a perspec-
tive as it goes far from a real world situation where combinations are shown to have much 
higher level of efficiency and convenience. 
Reality Check: Assessing the (Un)Likelihood of Cyberterrorism by Maura Conway 
Dr Conway in her research looks at the likelihood of cyberterrorism from a perspective of 
four hypotheses: 
1. “First, the costs of cyber attacks – although difficult to estimate – are vastly higher than 
those of non-cyber equivalents, such as car bombings.  
2. Second, terrorist groups typically lack the mastery to carry out successful cyber attacks 
which are exponentially more difficult than non-cyber terrorism.  
3. Third, the destructive potential of non-cyber attacks can be far more readily materi-
alised than that of cyber attacks.  
4. And, fourth, cyberterrorism lacks the theatricality of more conventional attacks and 
therefore is likely to be less desirable to terrorist groups” [3].  
The conclusion would be the same as other authors came across, but Dr Conway goes a bit 
more realistic and states that we do not actually know about capabilities of terrorist 
groups. We can only judge by what did they do already and we have no access to what 
they might do in any observant future. There is no bulletproof intelligence and any data 
can be questioned. 
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But still comparing cost of a pure physical and pure cyber attacks author sums up that for 
now physical means are cheaper and much more visual than cyber is going to be in any 
observant future. She compares Stuxnet with Boston Marathon bombings, where just low 
home-cooked bombs caused several deaths and huge media attention along with the public 
response, whereas Stuxnet is still not widely known and not so many people can even 
comprehend what exactly has happened there. Both bombs and strategy applied were of a 
very low quality, but Stuxnet by approximate calculations might have cost more than 10 
millions US dollars [3]. So far so good, seems like an obvious choice. 
Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, the Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point 
or Patriot Games? by Michael Stohl 
Here article actually points to a very crucial moment – where is the line when we can call 
an attack to contain “cyber” in it in any way? It states that in general there is a failure in 
distinction between using Internet and other technologies for organisational purposes such 
as communication and information transfer and using digital part to actually commit an 
attack. Therefore it calls for a clear understanding what is a cyber part of an attack. 
This article shows that cyber side of terrorism was a valid concern 10 years ago already. 
“Much before 9/11 there had been great angst about the possibilities of cyber terrorism, 
including oft stated fears about a digital Pearl Harbour. This fear was further enhanced by 
the Y2K problem often referred to as the millennium bug by those who sought to drama-
tise the threat. Despite the fact that these fears have yet to be matched by real events, in 
the context of the post 9/11 concern with terrorism and the global war on terrorism, the 
threat of cyber terrorism remains high on the list of public and professional fears” [7]. 
Though this source is much older than other looked at in this review, the author already 
takes into account possibility of a mixed approach. He mentioned that in old times Al 
Qaeda group was learning how to fly, now there are acquiring a new skill – hacking. And 
as we see nowadays, they are doing quite well. 
Quite realistic and sane view was presented by Dorothy Denning, when she was speaking 
to the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism of the Committee on Armed Services of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, mentioned in this article: “Thus, at this time, cyber terror-
ism does not seem to pose an imminent threat. This could change. For a terrorist, it would 
have some advantages over physical methods. It could be conducted remotely and anony-
mously, and it would not require the handling of explosives or a suicide mission. It would 
likely garner extensive media coverage, as journalists and the public alike are fascinated 
by practically any kind of computer attack. Indeed cyber terrorism could be immensely 
appealing precisely because of the tremendous attention given to it by the government and 
media” [7]. 
Among other things this work actually has shown reasons why cyber means might be at-
tractive for terrorists groups. They allow to cover activities, safe resources such as lives of 
group members so recruiting would not be such a bargain etc. 
4.1. Aurora Generator Test 
As a separate point we would like to analyse an example of a physical impact of a cyber 
attack. Such demonstration was performed in 2007 by Idaho National Laboratory and is 
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known as Aurora Generator Test which involved controlled hacking into a replica of a 
power plant's control system [32]. In a nutshell, by having a remote control researches 
were able to rapidly open and close a diesel generator circuit breakers out of phase from 
the rest of the grid and cause it to explode. 
"What people had assumed in the past is the worst thing you can do is shut things down. 
And that's not necessarily the case. A lot of times the worst thing you can do, for example, 
is open a valve – have bad things spew out of a valve," said Joe Weiss of Applied Control 
Solutions [32]. 
From the video footage of the impact in the controlled environment we see that the attack 
was able to take the equipment out of order completely and rather fast . If we apply the 1
same result to a system of a bigger scale, it can lead to months before power can be 
restored. Hardware is the hardest part to fix, as we also saw in Ukrainian attack – several 
operations are still performed in a manual manner because of hardware damage [29]. 
From a price perspective potential impact is described as: 
"For about $5 million and between three to five years of preparation, an organisation, 
whether it be transnational terrorist groups or nation states, could mount a strategic attack 
against the United States," said O. Sami Saydjari of the nonprofit Professionals for Cyber 
Defense. Economist Scott Borg, who produces security-related data for the federal gov-
ernment, projects that if a third of the country lost power for three months, the economic 
price tag would be $700 billion. "It's equivalent to 40 to 50 large hurricanes striking all at 
once. It's greater economic damage than any modern economy ever suffered. It's greater 
than the Great Depression. It's greater than the damage we did with strategic bombing on 
Germany in World War II" [32]. 
But we need to keep in mind that here they are assuming full cyber attack that does not 
involve any physical additions to complement the main process. Also these calculations 
were made in 2007 which means that with advancing technology many parts became 
much more cheap compared to then.  
 https://youtu.be/fJyWngDco3g1
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5. Research Methodology 
In our research we combine two methods, where one helps to provide a comprehensive 
model to describe scenarios and other gives a simple and rather certain way to evaluate 
those scenarios in a context of their cost. 
5.1. Attack Trees for Modelling the Scenarios 
One of the biggest challenges in cost assessment is to separate intuition from numbers 
based on facts. Our intuition takes into account only our overall experience and sometimes 
irrelevant memories which could easily lead us to making wrong decisions. Also intuition 
is not much of a help in new, unknown conditions. To overcome this constraint and have a 
better overview of the situation multiple techniques were developed.  
To present the model of our attack scenarios that we compare we use Attack Tree type of 
diagrams. It gives structured and focused overview of the situation we describe in a  com-
pact and easy way to comprehend. It also allows us to have some space for variations and 
flexibility, as well as the help our imagination to picture the link between actions and their 
consequences along with the effort and preparation step that take us to the main goal by 
saving the logic of certain attack as the relation “father –> son”  between nodes. 
We will construct a prototype system to which these attack trees apply. We would need 
two trees – one for full cyber scenario and one for hybrid. 
“Attack trees are models of reality” [4] – they show different paths that could be taken to 
achieve the ultimate goal – the root node. Our ultimate goal we define here as creation of 
physical damage. It reasons by the fact that any terrorist attack pursues the BTKP – break 
things kill people – type of impact. 
Attack tree in its essence is a decision making model that demonstrates different ways of 
situation progress and its consequences. It is widely used in security risk assessment and 
attack modelling as it allows to predict attacker’s behaviour in the most precise way – be-
cause the main focus here is on the attacker, his actions are being described and analysed, 
not the defender capabilities. In this type of analysis we are trying to see what could be 
done to us, rather than analysing from what kind of attacks we are able to protect our sys-
tem. If we look at the threat model from this point of view, it decreases the possibility of 
missing something or overlooking certain action for which we might not yet be prepared. 
In attack tree construction defender’s abilities are not taken that much into account, it is 
purely a description of attackers capabilities and paths he might take, along with the deci-
sions made and tools used. Defence mechanisms can only be a part of reasoning for levels 
of sophistication and increased cost because the better system is protected, the more ex-
pensive and hard will it be to penetrate. 
Potential attack tree would be applied to a hypothetical structure of the power plant, sim-
plified for the sake of a better overview and modelling. Here we would concentrate our 
attention on physical access levels which can vary from general area to critical closed ob-
jects.  
Access zones of our power plant are defined as:  
1 – critical area, restricted access, biometric authentication; 
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2 – administrative area, restricted access using assigned card and/or passwords;  
3 – general area, access is somehow restricted to only workers of the object and verified 
visitors.  
We can assume that all zones are covered by video surveillance and there is no “white” 
zones. We cannot guarantee any level of loyalty to the facility of the working personal as 
we use the insider scenario as a possible assumption to support some of our attack vectors. 
It is very important to define both attacker and defender for a particular attack tree as it 
influences its scale and variations hugely. A good explanation for this need is provided by 
Terrance R Ingoldsby:  
“Attack tree analysis incorporates information about a specific defender’s adversaries and 
the benefits they will realise from carrying out an attack against a particular defender. This 
precision is a virtue because it offers the hope that predictions will be accurate for a given 
situation. However, this specificity also makes it difficult to compare defender-specific 
predictions with statistics that are generalised over a wide variety of defenders and attack-
ers. For example, consider two technically identical security systems. The risks associated 
with a particular attack may differ considerably between the systems because the assets 
they are protecting also differ. The different potential rewards may attract different adver-
saries with different skills, resources and motivations. Technically identical failures can 
have significantly different business impacts on their respective organisations (which also 
affects the risk)” [4].  
Also one of the challenges that goes along with the attack tree is working with unknown. 
Most of the assessment tools base their evaluation on statistics data and events that oc-
curred before. Attack tree, from the other hand, also has in its structure threats that have 
never been performed before. Proposed methodology leaves it fully to the scale of fantasy 
of the researched who has to come up with the ideas about all potential dangers. When 
constructing the attack tree, we need to take into account both past events along with the 
feasible combination of tools and intentions that could produce totally new result.  
We can somehow compare attack trees with decision making trees that are applied in busi-
ness and financial planning. With the only difference – here we would need to play a role 
of an attacker and then tree will represent adversary’s decision making process with its 
paths and options.  
Downside of attack tree is its dependency on strict parameters. To build a feasible attack 
tree we have to know our attacker and his capabilities quite well. We should be aware of 
his skills, physical and cyber capabilities, it is also very important to know and understand 
his motivation which would give us a hint on how far he is willing to go and how much to 
sacrifice only to be able to cause the root event. Attack trees also rely on our ability to 
think as an attacker and go out of usual frame of events. We have to be able to come up 
with new ideas of what could happen because that is exactly what attackers do – there are 
some time-proof methods and actions that they use more or less on a regular basis, but 
their aim is to come up with new ways of destruction and spreading fear. Both sides 
evolve, so both sides have to adjust and be creative.  
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Attack tree gives us a good set of data to then create a secure and less vulnerable frame-
work, but it requires a lot of our imagination and role playing to collect the initial data for 
us to analyse.  
To verify results and do an error assessment we use references for each node that describes 
the scenario we are presenting and gives information about the resources required to get to 
that node and perform stated action. 
Attack trees allow us to plan our security measures taking possible threats as a back-
ground, our foundation. We go step by step on every more or less real action that could be 
performed against our system and evaluate its probability. As a final result attack tree 
gives us a clear idea of possible attack vectors in one big pictures filled both with context 
and comparable options. 
5.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis for Evaluation 
As for the evaluation and comparison between two scenarios – a pure cyber and a hybrid 
one – we use cost-benefit analysis that would give us a clear answer to which way can be 
more preferable and affordable for groups and associations that we present as our attack-
ers, namely non-state funded terrorist organisations. By its definition, “Cost benefit analy-
sis (CBA), sometimes called benefit costs analysis (BCA), is a systematic approach to es-
timating the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives (for example in transactions, activi-
ties, functional business requirements or projects investments); it is used to determine op-
tions that provide the best approach to achieve benefits while preserving savings” [18]. 
Basically, it allows us to see the total sum of resources spent on achieving a concrete result 
and be able to compare those sums between themselves. By resources here we mean 
amount of money required to cover the cost of each attack scenario. 
In case of our cyber component, we can evaluate how much money does the equipment 
cost and what is the market price for the skills needed to cover those nodes.  
One of the advantages of using CBA analysis is being able to analyse data that is closely 
tied to reality – we do not just fantasise, we also verify how close our ideas are to the real 
world. It also gives us simplicity as the idea behind this method is to see whether benefits 
outweigh cost and make our decision based on that. From the other side, it also requires us 
to be as precise and accurate with our resource estimation as possible. CBA gives us an 
easy way to present our calculations, but if source data our our assumption is wrong, the 
final result will be far from a plausible representation of researched scenario [19]. 
Our final goal is to determine how much a certain scenario would cost in a sense of money 
and other resources (equipment and intellectual level, but mainly we are talking about 
money). This will allow other researchers in the future to use this result to reason if terror-
ist organisation have enough money to conduct such attack if someone would ever start a 
research on a potential terrorist organisation budget. 
For simplification and better comprehension we will build a prototype of a theoretical 
model of a power plant, including its network topology and physical infrastructure, as well 
as map them together. 
We will validate our results by providing relevant reference for each node, action and price 
we find. 
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5.3. Cost Function 
In our research we define benefit as achieving the main goal, root node of our attack tree, 
and cost – as the amount of resources required to get to that node. Which means that bene-
fit is the same for cyber and hybrid scenario – a physical destruction. Therefore we only 
compare costs as it can require different amount of resources to achieve the same goal. So 
we modify the method a bit as we will not compare benefit to cost (as benefits here are the 
same), but rather cost of different presented scenarios to see if our assumption of hybrid to 
be the cheapest one is correct. Therefore as a cost function for the path we will use the 
following logic – cost of the root node consists of costs of its children. If those have OR 
relation between them, then the cheapest cost is added to the cost of the parent; if AND –
 both costs are added. In this case the total sum for the end goal will be determined by the 
cheapest path and we just need to see which one will it be – cyber or hybrid (bids on hy-
brid). 
If some leaves are repetitive, to avoid computation doubles we count the cost of repetitive 
path only once and omit it for other nodes focusing on the total sum instead of being pre-
cise about each subgoal. So if for retrieving the personnel data and for compromising the 
badge scan it is required to research the system that involves some costs and both of those 
subgoals are required to achieve the root goal, we will only count cost of researching the 
system once. 
In some cases the node will purely consist of cost of its children, sometimes it will have 
additional resources added for that specific action as attackers might need additional re-
sources to fulfil a particular sub-goal. Here is an example of how it works for our research: 
We defined prices for the starting leaves a1.1, a1.2, a1.3 and a1.4 – these would be taken 
from reference articles and other resources. Next level is partially defined by the lower 
one with some additional costs involved – we can see that a2.1 has in it costs of its two 
children (given that they have AND relation) and also has +5 cost units to itself (as if this 
node requires extra cost units to be completed in addition to children’s cost). The a2.2 
node has children with OR relation and has no additional cost involved – so we take the 
cost of the cheapest child. In the end our root note has OR relation between its own chil-
dren so we again take the cheapest one which results in the total cost of 15.  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Figure 1. Cost function
6. Background Scenario 
In this section we are going to present the general physical settlement of our target – a 
power plant – and the exact goal that we want to achieve when executing scenarios shown 
in our attack trees. We will not go into much of details like length of security code or any-
thing like that, because our mission here is to give basic overview of what might go wrong 
and in what scenario so later we can create our defence strategy based on that. 
First part will describe the physical infrastructure of a typical power plant, including ac-
cess levels, usual means of security and perimeter plan. In second part we discuss more 
what we want to achieve from a perspective of a non-state sponsored terrorist group and 
their motivation to do so. And finally in third we will try to make a connection between 
first two and show what that group can do in on given playground and try to predict some 
consequences. 
Practically we can divide our target in three perimeters – “owner-controlled area”, which 
corresponds to the lowest level of security and can even be a part of a “guest area” still 
with with somehow controlled access (scan gates for example, to ensure that no restricted 
materials or items are brought into the facility); “protected area” is already secured with 
badge scan and more sophisticated security means – this area can have some control cen-
tres and SCADA servers, laboratories etc; and finally – “vital area” – which is the inner-
most circle, as far as possible from “owner-controlled area” and has in place the highest 
level of security and the most sophisticated defence means. The “vital area” is usually the 
reactor, cooling mechanism, used fuel rooms, alarm station, parts of SCADA systems, and 
other life-dependant facilities [8]. In general we would certainly like to isolate vital area 
from outer access, which means that this area is not connected to the Internet. Also securi-
ty measures are designed to include safe shutdown of the system in case of a breach (we 
keep in mind that nothing is absolutely unbreakable). 
Though we can already assume that disconnection from the Internet still cannot save the 
system from the breach. As the situation with Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear power 
plants has shown even fully isolated environment can hold a cyber attack. So for that our 
prototyped power plant also has a CERT team in facility that is supposed to deal with the 
accident caused by an attack if such is to happen. 
Means of physical access control may include but not be limited to: 
• “physical barriers, electronic detection and assessment systems, and illuminated detec-
tion zones; 
• electronic surveillance and physical patrols of the plant perimeter and interior structures; 
• bullet-resisting, protected positions throughout the plant; 
• robust barriers to critical areas; 
• background checks and access control for employees” [8]. 
This typical set gives a general overview of what kind of attack it is trying to preserve 
from – physical intervention, attempt to use unauthorised ID, insider man. For the attacker 
it is very important to also understand defenders mind so the attackers will not waste ener-
gy and resources to act in a way that is already taken into account and put as an orientation 
for a security system. It is always a mind guess and who is lucky to get it first. 
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In our scenario we put the main focus on surveillance and physical access points such as 
scan gates and badge authentication at doors between different zones. 
In this sense seems reasonable to move to our second part – what do we want to do with 
this power plant? How do we want to disrupt its workflow and why would we want to do 
this. The possibility of a terrorist attack on a power plant or any object of critical in-
frastructure is a media background noise for quite some time already. From “Diehard 4” 
to already performed attempts of various sophistication such as sniper attack on California 
power station in April 2013 [9] and others. The recent report from Chatham House alerted 
that UK power plants are awfully unprepared for a cyber or mixed type of attack [10]. The 
main issue raised there was reliance on commercial software suits and utilisation age of 
some facilities  – basically most of UK power plants are not even designed with current 
attack scope in mind, and we are talking here about one of the most advanced nations in a 
sense of security and intelligence. We can assume that countries with deeper history of ne-
glecting outside threats might have even bigger gaps in their infrastructure design. 
Our goal, and basis for the forthcoming attack tree, would be an assumption that terrorists’ 
goal is creating physical damage and system disruption in the “vital area”. There were al-
ready mentioned a few incidents with the first two access levels, but we know that the ul-
timate goal is always to go further and cause as much and as critical damage as possible. 
In this sense successful attack on the vital area is an absolute win for our prototyped 
group! 
A few words about the group itself, so we have a basic understanding of the who we are 
dealing with. This group is a not state sponsored so they have somehow limited financial 
support and resources. They have access to the basic trainings for both physical attacks – 
bombs making, fighting, shooting etc – and knowledge base for cyber intervention. They 
have their motivation which can vary from political to religious or semi-personal even, 
they believe that workflow disruption will be a justified act to draw attention, scare, pun-
ish or whatever else is the main move here. They want to break thing and kill people, 
spread fear and call for action. They do not take into account their own lives – dying but 
still performing a successful intervention would be a win for them. 
Drawing the line, this group’s main goal is to damage the prototyped power plant enough 
to cause its shutdown, ideally distortion, and if possible cause some effect on human lives 
who might be working there on be dependant on functionality of this power plant. 
With a described decorations and leading actors we can now start building up our scenario. 
For attack to succeed a few moments should be accomplished: 
1. get-in: our group should be able to get in the system without being noticed or tracked, 
they should gain access to all areas including vital and have enough time to be there in-
sensibly; 
2. plug-in: they should be able to place the destruction mechanism (bomb, electric im-
pulse generator, bonfire, anything) as close to the reactor as possible to cause the maxi-
mum damage; 
3. win: even if they get there and place the “bomb”, they still need to make sure that it 
works – this should mean that defence mechanism on the place would not be able to 
contain the explosion (stop it from affecting systems and spreading) and nothing else 
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will prevent the attack group from finishing the operation (such as security personal that 
can appear at the site and stop the attackers); 
4. (optional) get-out: if attackers manage to escape from facility after performing an at-
tack, it means that our system fails in reaction phase – even if attackers got in, security 
measures would prevent them from escaping so they can be called to responsibility and 
applicable punishment and payback. 
Preparation steps would include: 
• collection of information about the inside structure and scheme plan of the facility, its 
security means (time intervals between checks, locations of the guards, surveillance cen-
tre etc); 
• applicable trainings for both physical and cyber so destruction mechanism could be cre-
ated and security posts passed; 
• planning the post-attack action which might include escaping the perimeter or even just 
making sure that media got the image and aftermath is directed by the remaining mem-
bers of the group so it will not be for nothing. 
With this basic build up we can already start our journey into attacker’s mind and try to 
foresee how, where and what can go wrong. Now let us learn in more details how each se-
curity area is defined and protected. 
6.1. Network Topology and Access Levels 
As an orientation and example for our research we will use a sample topology from Yoco-
gawa Whitepaper Plant Network Security [11] given below:  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Figure 2. Network topology mapped to physical levels
Level 4: Owner-controlled (general) area 
Outer perimeter, sufficiently distant from the main vital area, minimal level of security 
including video surveillance, package control scan (alcohol, explosives, firearms are pro-
hibited). Network part includes “office zone” that is connected to the outer world (Inter-
net), but is protected by firewall and some anti-virus scanning systems. The 3rd party net-
work can be another department in its own VLAN. We can see that CCTV server that are 
responsible for the video surveillance of the whole facility are also located in general area, 
which makes it easier to compromise and use or shadow to go further. Here are also locat-
ed servers for badge scan match to access the protected area (levels 3 and 3.5). 
Level 3 and 3.5: Protected area 1 
Includes administrative end-devices and VTS Portal servers. Behind the firewall, but in 
the same physical zone, we also see WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) server, that 
is responsible for distributing software updates around the facility. Which means that hav-
ing compromised the access point between general and protected areas gives us admin ac-
cess to pretty much the whole network and allows attackers to install whatever software 
needed that would look like an update – would not be the first time for Windows [36]. 
Level 2: Protected area 2 
It is the location of the Safety PCN – Process Control Network, that is a communications 
network that is used to transmit instructions and data between control and measurement 
units and some parts of SCADA equipment. It also has servers for the biometric scan data-
bases that verify access to the vital area. 
Level 1: Vital area 
From a network perspective this zone locates some of the SCADA servers and control 
networks. Apart from that it is also where the main reactor, cooling systems and direct 
control panels are placed. This is the main point of interest, finish line for our attackers. 
Getting here means winning the whole thing.  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7. Attack Trees 
“A chain is only as strong as its weakest link”  
Thomas Reid 
When building an attack tree and assigning a corresponding value to each node, we need 
to keep in mind the level of available tools for each task to be performed. It is also impor-
tant to mention that this can change with time and some task will require less resources as 
more tools and knowledge will become freely available for use [25]. Therefore our results 
are to be taken in the context of a current timeframe – 2018 and around 5 years after. 
As our root goal we take a physical impact. Just hacking the power plant is not in our 
scope of interest anymore, something should be explicitly broken – service disrupted for a 
longer time or some part of the power plan destroyed – as the result of this attack. Possibly 
the whole facility goes out of order and maybe some people get injured. Intention to cause 
a visible consequence was already expressed therefore we need to focus our attack sce-
nario on BTKP (break-things-kill-people) to evaluate its cost and make a pre-assumption 
of probability of such event [29]. 
Here we portray a combination of the different paths that can be followed to achieve our 
root goal. The pure cyber path that is focused on compromising SCADA communication 
system is taken from [20] with some adjustments to finalise the goal, using Aurora Vulner-
ability [32] as a point of inspiration. The information-technology scenario that consists of 
a mix of cyber nodes and physical means uses CCTV system as a main objective of the 
attack for its cyber components. We also broaden the scenario with possibility to include 
an insider help to perform some steps. 
For the preparation stage attackers look for all information available about the targeted 
systems – both physical and network topology, possibly search in Shodan for our particu-
lar power plant and find its connection to the outside world, what protocols it uses, on 
what operating system etc. To retrieve information about physical components and their 
location attackers can use insider cooperation or even drones as it was spotted before [24]. 
“There are two broad categories of attacks. Stage I intrusions are those designed to gain 
information. These are the traditional espionage efforts we’ve become accustomed to hear-
ing about, where information is stolen or deleted. A Stage II attack could result in tempo-
rary loss of power, physical damage to equipment, or other types of scenarios we often 
hear about. It is important to note these are not trivial to accomplish. If an attacker wants 
to progress to a Stage II attack, during the Stage I intrusion they have to steal information 
specific to that industrial environment” [29]. 
Stage I attack can reveal more about the protocols used, their version, login credentials, 
access levels etc etc, it also “... can include emails; communications involving design 
plans; information about security assessments; emails or documents that contain pass-
words; and more” [35]. 
7.1. Sample Attack Tree For the Full Cyber Attack 
Simplified attack tree includes these main steps: 
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ROOT GOAL: send malicious instructions to Slave to break the cycle of circuit breakers 
to cause an explosion 
1. load shell app to Master  
1.1.corrupt Master with invalid Slave response 
 AND 
1.1.1. identify MODBUS Device 
1.1.2. MODBUS Message Scan 
  AND 
1.1.2.1. gain access to remote site / SCADA transmission 
1.1.2.2. deploy MODBUS Message Scanning Tool 
1.2.compromise Slave 
Now let us have a closer look at the sub-trees of our main diagram to have a better context 
for understanding steps required to perform a cyber attack on a power plant. One of the 
main prerequisites for even being able to scan for a device that uses MODBUS protocol 
for communication is having access to the SCADA system: 
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Figure 3. Simple cyber attack tree
ROOT SUB-GOAL: gain access to remote site or SCADA transmission system  
OR 
1. gain physical access to remote field site equipment 
2. gain access to SCADA link media 
 OR 
2.1. intercept SCADA link over radio link 
2.2. intercept wiring leaving building or compound 
3. gain local Process Control Network (PCN) access 
 OR 
3.1. gain physical access to device on the PCN 
3.2. gain dial-in access to device on PCN 
3.3. gain wireless access to the PCN 
4. gain remote access to PCN via IT network 
 AND 
4.1.gain Network Access to IT network 
 OR 
4.1.1. gain physical access to IT network 
4.1.2. gain remote access to IT network 
4.2. compromise or bypass connection device between IT and PCN 
5. gain access via semi-trusted 3rd party 
 AND 
5.1.gain access to semi-trusted 3rd party network 
 OR 
5.1.1. gain physical access to semi-trusted 3rd party 
5.1.2.gain remote access to semi- trusted 3rd party 
5.2.compromise protection between 3rd party system and PCN 
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Figure 4. Access to remote site or SCADA transmission system
Here the main focus is PCN – a Process Control Network, which is a communication net-
work that is used to transmit instructions and data between control and measurement units 
and SCADA equipment. In our topology main PCN servers are located in Level 3 of phys-
ical topology and we need to bypass one or two firewalls in order to get there by cyber 
means. 
Going further we also need to identify a MODBUS device which requires us to follow one 
of these paths: 
ROOT SUB-GOAL: identify MODBUS Device 
OR 
1. social engineering (e.g. pretend to be PLC manufacture’s service engineer) 
2. TCP/UDP port scan for port 502 
 AND 
2.1. gain local PCN network access (non-blind) 
2.2. deploy TCP/UDP scanning tool 
3. MODBUS Message Scan 
 AND 
3.1. gain access to remote site or SCADA transmission system 
3.2. deploy MODBUS Message Scanning Tool 
4. management/application protocol scan 
 AND 
4.1. gain local PCN access (non-blind) 
4.2. deploy Fingerprinting Tool 
 OR 
4.2.1. scan HTTP/SNMP/Telnet port for identifying characteristics 
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Figure 5. Identify MODBUS Device
4.2.2. scan other identifying ports 
5. sniff existing MODBUS session 
One of the main point of vulnerability of MODBUS protocol is the time when it was de-
signed – power plants used to be isolated systems with the network cut from the outside 
world with only trusted devices connected. This paradigm has changed, but MODBUS 
protocol still handles its communication as if it was 20 years ago [20]. Which means no 
encryption and not much of filtering the instructions sent between Master (client) and 
Slave (server). 
And last but not least – compromising the Slave server: 
In total the full cyber attack tree can be seen as such: 
By rough estimation this scheme costs around $5-10 millions for attackers to perform 
[32]. We will take this price range as our starting point for comparison. 
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Figure 6. Compromise Slave
Figure 7. Full cyber attack tree
7.2. Sample Attack Tree for the Hybrid Attack 
Combining physical and information-technology oriented means makes it both easier and 
harder to implement. From one side, it needs lower level of sophistication and skill set, but 
it also requires the attack group to be physically present at the power plant side to make 
things happen. It is like comparing Diehard 4 with Mission Impossible. 
The summary tree is presented below: 
ROOT GOAL: physical destruction in vital zone 
AND 
1. get an explosive inside the facility 
 AND 
1.1. construct an explosive 
1.2. disable protective system (access gates) 
2. get attack group to the vital zone 
 AND 
2.1. compromise surveillance 
 OR 
2.1.1. get physical access to CCTV servers 
2.1.2. get remote access to CCTV server 
2.2. get internal personnel badge 
2.3. compromise badge access database 
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Figure 8. Simple hybrid attack tree
If we look in more details of what is required, we can see that our goal heavily depends on 
two main achievement point – getting the attack group and destruction materials inside the 
facility and making sure it reaches the deepest level, our vital zone, for the most dramatic 
effect. The breakdown of those sub-goals is presented below: 
ROOT SUB-GOAL: get an explosive inside the facility 
AND 
1. construct an explosive 
2. disable protective system (access gates) 
 OR 
2.1. gain remote access to protective system server 
2.2. gain physical access to remote field site equipment 
To be more specific about the protective systems, by it we mean mostly scan gates that 
make sure no restricted items or materials are brought inside the facility. We can see gates 
of the same purpose in other CIO such airport, the security checkpoint before entering 
boarding area. Those gates are located in owner-protected / general area and are highly 
sensitive to electromagnetic interference [41]. Being close enough physically enables at-
tackers to disrupt its functions and give a positive light to a forbidden item and materials. 
Servers responsible for fetching results of security scans are also located in general area, 
along with CCTV servers (though they are behind two firewalls if we look at the network 
topology). To get this access attackers can pretend to be an onsite workers, electricians or 
just about anyone in the uniform! 
Part of that path is also covering compromising video surveillance to make sure our group 
is not detected where it is not supposed to be and completes the mission. It is not only 
about entering the power plant, we can even say it is not about it at all – but when attack-
ers are already in the vital zone it is going to take time to set up and detonate (or make 
sure it detonates remotely) the explosive material. As there are not so many people inside 
the critical zone, the workers’ eyes can be somehow avoided, but cameras would still be 
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Figure 9. Get an explosive inside the facility
up so this part should be intercepted. Otherwise even with going through all levels, they 
can still get busted at the last stage of the operation. 
ROOT SUB-GOAL: compromise surveillance 
OR 
1. perform an audio attack on CCTV server to prevent it from recording 
1.1. get physical access to CCTV servers 
2. load malicious instructions to CCTV server 
2.1. get remote access to CCTV server 
2.1.1. bypass 2nd firewall 
  OR 
2.1.1.1. gain access to the semi-trusted 3rd party network 
2.1.1.2. get access to business LAN 
  OR 
2.1.1.2.1. get physical access to office domain zone 
2.1.1.2.2. get remote access to office domain zone 
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Figure 10. Compromise surveillance
There are couple of ways how CCTV servers and even some other not focused on record-
ing devices can be compromised or at least be out of function for some time. One of such 
ways is performing an acoustic attack on the device – it requires close proximity to the 
servers so attackers will need to get to the general area by then. But this part is covered by 
other nodes that take action beforehand. “The basic principle behind this attack is that 
sound waves introduce mechanical vibrations into an HDD's data-storage platters. If the 
sound is played at a specific frequency, it creates a resonance effect that amplifies the vi-
bration effect” [37]. Depending on the storage capacity, different frequencies are used. For 
example, to get 4TB HDD out of order, it will take a frequency of 9.5Hz [37]. What also 
comes handy – the average range of human hearing starts from 20Hz, which means that 
the human ear will not be able to detect this attack if low enough frequency is used. Even 
if there are dogs at the perimeter, they cannot hear anything below 40Hz (even though 
dog’s ears are more sensitive to higher pitches than humans). The reason it even works, 
“Because hard drives store vast amounts of information inside small areas of each platter, 
they are programmed to stop all read/write operations during the time a platter vibrates so 
to avoid scratching storage disks and permanently damaging an HDD” [37]. 
Another way of making sure video recordings are taken care of, is to get remote access to 
CCTV servers. This can be done whether by physically being onsite (which is planned 
anyway) or by bypassing two cyber hubs – first and second firewalls that protect CCTV 
servers from 3rd party network and connection to the outside world via Internet and office 
network. As attackers get through those hubs, the exploit it pretty much one click ahead. 
There has been discovered a serious vulnerability in how a camera picks up on a language 
interface that pretty much allows for a command line injection that can be anything. This 
vulnerability is present if a wide range of vendors and most of them did not show a desire 
to do anything about it [38]. In this case attackers do not even need to handcraft the ex-
ploit, it is available already. And a botnet created from cameras had been done already at a 
big scale – in 2016 around 25 000 CCTV devices became part of a botnet that performed 
DDoS attacks again couple of small business instances [42]. 
And to finalise detailed analysis of getting things done using both physical and cyber 
means, let us gather all the main stages that are obligatory to fulfil in order to get the at-
tack group inside unnoticed and all the way up to the critical zone: 
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Figure 11. Get attack group to the vital zone
One way to get far is to have an internal personnel badge and make sure that is has re-
quired access level. This can be done by stealing an existing badge – and we have seen 
terrorist to go as far as a murder to get one – an employee of a Belgian nuclear plant was 
killed and his badge stolen in 2016, not so long after the airport attack [43]. Different other 
scenarios had already been tried out a couple of times with a varying level of success [24] 
but in it essence it might also mean to find out who works in the power plant, follow or 
stalk them, get their credentials and use those to get inside the facility. Attackers can use 
the original badge or make a copy of it. Both scenarios carry the risk of compromised 
badge being reported prior to attack, so there might be a need to copy the badge in a dis-
creet manner or make sure that compromised worker will not have a possibility to report 
to anyone anymore. 
A somehow easier way is to get an insider to cooperate. We would expect that employers 
would go through regular and random background screenings but that firstly is not always 
the case and also gives us certainty to only some level but we can never guaranty if a per-
son turns. “In 2012 two employees at the country’s Doel nuclear power station left Bel-
gium to fight in Syria. ... And earlier this year (2016) authorities investigating the Paris 
attacks discovered video surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear official in the home of 
one of the Paris suspects” [39]. 
Insider is a wildcard in many senses. We can never predict how this person will behave, 
what motivates them, to which part and to what extent can he or she be dedicated, will 
there be a moment that conscious or fear catches up with them and turns the whole opera-
tion to dust. It is also unknown how much (if anything) insider can ask for the service. 
Some can do it driven by their believes, some can be blackmailed or threatened into this 
and some indeed can just ask for money. Therefore we do not include “price” of an insider 
in our calculations. 
As we mentioned before, even with the badge or help of an insider, we still need to make 
sure that we can pass to the needed level using that badge. To achieve that the access data-
bases should be compromised as well. Those databases contain corresponding information 
about badge authentication and biometric data of employers that it checks when they try to 
pass to the critical zone. As those servers are located together with other protection sys-
tems, it will take attackers the same steps as getting remote access to CCTV server – so we 
do not stop on this now. 
Combining it all together our compiled attack tree for a hybrid approach looks like this:  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Even visually we can see that cyber and physical nodes are pretty balanced – it takes 
combined effort to achieve the end result.  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Figure 12. Full hybrid attack tree
8. Result Calculations 
Here we present the results of our findings regarding the cost of our nodes with a few an-
notations and explanation – context is important. The cost calculations are based on a 
function presented in section 5.2 of this research. We look at the cost of each of our leaf 
and depending on nodes relations calculate the price of the sub-goals, which also might 
include some additional cost involved with the sub-goal itself, excluding cost of the repeti-
tive paths. Highlighted attack nodes are sub-goals detailed below or above. Defined price 
depends on level of sophistication required for a certain action and is taken in range of of-
fers to provide such service. The best way to cover cost of the cyber components is to see 
how much targeted exploit kits are priced on a market. 
“Quick definition: exploit kits (EKs) are programs that find flaws, weaknesses or mistakes 
in software apps and use them to gain access into a system or a network” [45]. 
Depending on complexity exploit kits can cost from $80 to $100 USD per day, $500 to 
$700 USD per week, and $1,400 to $2,000 USD per month [44]. It takes around 6-12 
months or more to prepare the cyber part of the attack [28], part of this preparation is also 
researching the targeted system (via Shodan queries or other means) and then developing 
an exploit kit. Taking into account high profile of the target, the exploit kit that attackers 
would need to penetrate firewalls and protective systems to get to CCTV server and/or 
badge scan we would focus on the high end of the pricing – $1,400 to $2,000 USD per 
month which ends up being from $8,400 to $24,000 USD in total (also keeping in mind 
that some systems such as biometric authentication requires higher level of sophistication). 
Talking about our physical component, the World Trade Center bomb used in 1993 cost 
only $400 USD to construct [2]. Even if we take into account inflation, it is still only 
around $690 USD [46]. The attack group will most certainly need two or three of such ex-
plosives to cause a significant damage bringing total cost of explosives to $1380 USD. 
We assume that our attack group does not have by default needed skills to use the exploit 
along with performing a proper Stage I attack and target system research. Also important 
to mention that some cyber components would need to be performed on the spot – which 
means things need to be done fast and correct, plus under pressure. So it is very likely that 
one-two specialists are required as an external resource to be hired as a part of the group. 
The average salary of IT specialist is $59,072 USD a year (depending on the area of com-
petence and country) [47]. We also need to keep in mind that this number only goes for a 
legal work so “the terrorist organisation planning to hire the computer professionals would 
have to increase those figures from three to five times, if not more” [2]. Preparing this 
kind of attack can take up to six months (or even twelve for some stages as getting through 
biometric scan systems) [28]. So for the taken 6-12 month of intense and illegal work to 
compromise critical systems of a power plant attackers would have to pay around 
$90,000–$300,000 USD per specialist. This is added to our cyber components. If at least 
one leaf has a need for cyber means (AND relation), we include the price of combined 
$180,000–$600,000 USD to the whole branch to reflect paycheque of two hired IT spe-
cialist, but we treat this number as a constant, meaning that even if the branch has more 
than one cyber leaf, it cost is still covered by $180,000–$600,000 USD, it does not multi-
ply itself because we expect those specialistі to have qualification and agree to perform all 
needed actions to ensure that IT part is covered. 
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As for attackers to be near the power plant and eventually inside it is not enough to just 
compromise surveillance but they also need to make sure that they will not look suspicious 
to actual employees. This is easily resolved by using a uniform – electrician, maintenance 
etc. On average this can cost from $100 to $300 USD for the clothing and small parts of 
equipment.  
To compromise CCTV server through acoustic attack does not cost any significant amount 
of money as the attackers just need to produce and play the sound at a concrete frequency. 
Getting an internal badge varies in price. For example, to make a copy costs around $700 
USD, and the instructions for making and using a device to do that are easily found online 
[49]. We evaluate stealing an existing badge at the same price as this point has a lot of un-
certainty attached to it and may require spending on travelling, stalking the personnel, dri-
ving here and there to different locations etc, so there are a lot of indirect costs. 
All prices in the table are in USD. Sub-goals marked with (*) have additional costs in-
volved besides the combination of their leaves. 
SUB-GOAL RELATION ATTACK NODES PRICE 
(NODES)
PRICE 
(TOTAL)
disable 
protective 
system (access 
gates)* (adds 
cyber)
OR
gain remote access to 
protective system server
188 400 – 
624 000
188 500 – 
624 300
gain physical access to 
remote field site equipment 
(pretend to be an onsite 
worker)
100 – 300
get an explosive 
inside the 
facility
AND
disable protective system 
(access gates)
188 500 – 
624 300 189 880 – 
625 680
construct an explosive 1380
get access to 
business LAN
OR
get remote access to office 
domain zone (bypass 1st 
firewall)
180 000 – 
600 000
100 – 300
get physical access to office 
domain zone
100 – 300
bypass 2nd 
firewall* (adds 
cyber)
OR
gain access to the semi-
trusted 3rd party network
180 000 – 
600 000 180 100 –
 600 300get access to business LAN 100 – 300
perform an 
audio attack on 
CCTV server to 
prevent it from 
recording
AND
get physical access to CCTV 
servers 100 – 300 100 – 300
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Table 1. Node price calculations
To see the final result we now need to combine prices of two main nodes of our hybrid 
attack tree – ”get attack group to the vital zone” and “get an explosive inside the 
facility” (minus duplicating IT assistance of $188,500 – $624,300 USD that includes IT 
professionals services and exploit kit).  
In total the price for performing this type of attack is in a range of $190,600 – $626,480 
USD. 
load malicious 
instructions to 
CCTV server
AND
get remote access to CCTV 
server
188 500 – 
624 300
188 500 – 
624 300
compromise 
surveillance
OR
perform an audio attack on 
CCTV server to prevent it 
from recording
100 – 300
100 – 300
load malicious instructions 
to CCTV server
188 500 – 
624 300
get internal 
personnel badge
OR
steal an existing badge 700
700make a copy of an existing 
badge
700
get an insider to cooperate N/A
compromise 
badge access 
database
AND bypass 2nd firewall
188 500 – 
624 300
188 500 – 
624 300
get attack group 
to the vital zone AND
compromise badge access 
database
188 500 – 
624 300
189 300 – 
625 100
get internal personnel 
badge
700
compromise surveillance 100 – 300
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9. Conclusions 
In the end we now try to answer the question “so what?”. We looked at the pure cyber 
path, as it is the main option many researchers consider when they talk about future possi-
ble threats to the critical infrastructure, but we also presented a new way of thinking about 
the attack vector – the hybrid path. We complemented the cyber scenario with the physical 
actions that simplified the operation and lowered sophistication level of the skill set and 
also reduced preparation time from 3-5 years [32] to almost 6 months [28]. We now see 
that the price comparison is a definite win on the hybrid side – with $5-10 millions USD 
needed to perform full cyber attack that could cause a physical damage, hybrid achieves 
the same effect with $200,000 – $700,000 USD. It is not even about the precise number 
anymore, we can already see the huge jump from millions to thousands and this might be 
enough to take this new approach into consideration when planning an attack on a power 
plant. 
Another question rises, will it actually happen in any foreseeable future? Frankly, still us-
ing a van to smash into the crowded street is way cheaper, takes less time to prepare and 
less resources to spend. And definitely reaches people at a bigger scale. Nice Attack that 
happened during Bastille Day celebrations in 2016 is still fresh in memory [50], but 
Ukrainian power plant outrage is known to a very narrow public which includes people 
affected and specialists in the field of security. Even though it has happened twice. 
So we can make a conclusion that maybe this will not become a go-to approach in the next 
couple of years, but with tools becoming cheaper and skills achieved easier, that day 
comes closer and closer. Already now, in 2018, this type of attack is cheap enough for a 
main known attack organisations such as ISIL and Hezbollah, and they have even claimed 
or tried to attack power plants in the past – recent attempt of a physical attack on Iraq 
power plant in 2017 by ISIL killed nearly 12 people [51]. This plate is definitely boiling. 
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I. Table of abbreviations and terms 
BTKP – Break Things Kill People 
CBA – Cost Benefit Analysis 
CCTV – Closed-Circuit Television 
CIO – Critical Infrastructure Object 
DDoS – Distributed Denial of Service 
EK – Exploit Kit 
ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
PCN – Process Control Network 
SCADA – Supervisory Controls and Data Acquisition 
VTS – Versatile Terminal Service application 
WSUS – Windows Server Update Services  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